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I. Introduction
The surge in capital flows to numerous countries in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America
and, more recently, several republics of the former Soviet Union during the early 1990s is well
documented in a large and growing literature.  Much of that work has debated whether external
factors, such as international interest rates, or domestic factors were mainly responsible for the
increased financial flows to many emerging-market economies.1/ Another recent strand of
literature has focused on the macroeconomic “countercyclical” policy response to the rising
inflows by documenting and evaluating the broad variety of policy responses of the capital-
importing countries.2/ 
Relatively few studies, however, have attempted to link these two strands of analysis and
by examining how the policy response to the early wave of capital flows eventually influenced
both the level and the composition of subsequent cross-border capital movements--hence
playing a potentially important "causal" role after the initial wave of inflows.3/  Furthermore,
few papers have analyzed, either theoretically or empirically, how the behavior of domestic
capital market and the financial sector has helped shape the volume and the form of the capital
flows, even though the conventional wisdom has stressed important differences between short-
term (or "hot money") flows and foreign direct investment (FDI).4/, 5/  The received wisdom
also has stressed key regional differences in the composition of flows; specifically, associating
the Asian countries with FDI while short-term flows are associated with the Latin American
2countries.  Insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that those regional differences have
not remained constant over time and thus cannot be regarded as structural in nature.  Regional
as well as cross-country patterns in the composition of flows, therefore, remain to be explained
in terms of the underlying domestic “countercyclical” policies as well as some of the features of
their financial and capital markets.
The aim of this paper is to fill some of those gaps.  Our dual objectives are to document
and explain the changing dynamics of cross-border capital movements in emerging markets in
recent years.  In attempting to explain these dynamics, our focus is on the role of the policy
response in shaping both the volume and the composition of capital inflows.  Specifically, we
assess the extent to which two broad types of policies--direct intervention in the capital account
(such as measures to control capital inflows) and the broad monetary-foreign exchange “policy
mix” (such as the extent of sterilized intervention)--have systematically influenced the nature
and dynamics of capital flows.  We also examine empirically a potential “pull” factor largely
ignored in the existing literature--the possible link between the volume of  portfolio flows and
the characteristics of the domestic equity market--most notably, its depth.  The latter is a
particularly relevant issue for the 1990s, in light of the growing importance of bond and equity
portfolio flows.  Along these dimensions we extend our earlier work (Montiel and Reinhart,
1999) by focusing on to what extent the relationship between capital flows and its push or pull
determinants varies across regions. Our main focus is on emerging markets in Asia and Latin
America.  In the process, we take stock of the answers the empirical literature has provided to
the questions of the causes of the inflows, the factors affecting the composition of the flows,
and the existence of contagion effects in international capital markets.
3The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections.  The next section reviews the
early literature on the factors driving the surge in capital flows.  Section III examines the more
recent pattern of capital inflows, raising the question of whether the conclusions derived from
the early literature should be reexamined in light of the changing patterns of such flows.  An
important suggestion that emerges from both of these sections is that the volume and
composition of capital flows may have become increasingly sensitive to the short-run
macroeconomic policies pursued by the recipient countries in recent years.  This theme is
developed in Section IV and is examined empirically for a panel of 15 countries from Africa,
Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America. Section V focuses on the role of the financial sector--
specifically the development and depth of the capital market in influencing the volume and
relative importance of portfolio flows--the most rapidly growing source of funds for emerging
markets in the 1990s.  The last section summarizes the key findings and discusses areas for
future research.
II. The Capital Inflow Literature
This section takes a retrospective look at factors that are frequently cited in explaining the
surge in inflows to a wide number of developing countries in the 1990s.  The objective is to
present a synthesis of the key findings the empirical literature on this topic and summarize where
we stand.
1. Conceptual issues
The capital account is an endogenous macroeconomic variable, and as such is likely to be
affected by a multitude of shocks of both domestic and foreign origin.  Because the
interpretation of the welfare consequences of capital inflows, as well as their likely
4sustainability, are both related to the nature of the shocks that generate such flows, early
research initially focused on identifying the factors that were driving the recent capital inflows. 
Because the direction and magnitude of such flows depend on the relative attractiveness of
placing funds in emerging markets vis-a-vis industrial-country markets, as well as on the ease
with which such transactions can be carried out, it may be useful to classify such factors into
three categories:
i. "Pull" factors.
Factors that operate through improvements in the risk-return characteristics of assets
issued by developing-country debtors have been dubbed "pull" factors in the empirical capital-
inflow literature.  What matters to private creditors, of course, is improvement in private risk-
return characteristics. Such improvements can arise from two different sources.  First, social
risk-return tradeoffs may have improved in these countries as a consequence of economic
reform, and this may be reflected in the characteristics of assets issued by debtors in such
countries. In this case, capital inflows would reflect welfare-enhancing borrowing for the
financing of new high-yield domestic investment opportunities  and/or welfare-enhancing
financing for consumption smoothing motivated by reform-induced increases in national wealth.
Second, the characteristics of claims acquired by private lenders may have improved as a
result of either the introduction or removal of distortions creating gaps between social and
private rates of return.  For example, if debt-overhang problems created a gap between social
and private rates of return in heavily-indebted countries, then resolution of such problems in the
context of Brady Plan agreements may allow private rates of return to reflect social returns
more accurately and thus create an incentive for the renewed flow of capital.  Alternatively, as
has been forcefully argued by Dooley (1996), the adoption of fixed exchange rates and deposit
5guarantees in the context of a liberalized but poorly supervised financial sector may create an
opportunity for foreign lenders to reap high and secure private rates of return that do not reflect
social returns on the resources that they transfer to the borrowing economy.  Clearly, the
welfare implications of capital flows depend on whether they are driven by the removal of a
previously-existing distortion or the introduction of a new one.  Similarly, their sustainability
will also be affected, since a country's creditworthiness is likely to improve with additional
external borrowing in one case and deteriorate in the other.
ii. "Push" factors.
"Push" factors are those that operate by reducing the attractiveness of lending to
industrial-country debtors.  Deterioration in the risk-return characteristics of assets issued by
industrial-country debtors is most widely cited in this context.  This happens essentially in
response to cyclical factors that temporarily depress rates of return on assets in the lending
country.  The collapse of asset values in Japan at the onset of the current recession in that
country,  the decrease in interest rates in the United States as a result of stimulative monetary
policy adopted in response to the 1990-91 recession, and the reduction of interest rates in the
United Kingdom after the pound dropped out of the ERM in September 1992 would each have
had the effect of driving capital abroad in search of higher short-run returns.  From the
perspective of the developing country, this represents an external financial shock, which may be
welcome or not depending on the country's circumstances.  For countries that had been credit-
constrained and remain heavily indebted, the shock is a favorable one.  However, its cyclical
origin threatens to make it temporary.  An important question for policy in borrowing countries
raised by shocks of this type, therefore, is whether the domestic private response  is likely to
optimally take into account the possibility of reversal.
6A different "push" factor with different implications for policy has to do with changes in
financial structure in capital-exporting countries.  The increased role of institutional lenders such
as mutual and pension funds as financial intermediaries, as well as the increased importance of
securitization, may represent a secular change which favors lending to emerging markets for
portfolio diversification reasons.  If so, and given the relatively small share of emerging markets
in the portfolios of institutional lenders, the sustainability implications would be very different
from those associated with cyclical factors.   To the extent that recent flows have been driven by
structural "push" factors of this type, flows are likely to be sustained at high levels for an
extended period of time.
iii. Financial integration
Lastly, increased capital flows may reflect strengthened financial integration due to the
removal of barriers to capital flows.  Such barriers may arise from explicit policy choices or due
to technological innovations affecting, for example, information costs.  Capital-account
liberalization had been widely adopted as the outcome of explicit policy decisions in both
industrial and developing countries at the onset of the current capital-inflow episode.  While it
may seem that the removal of such distortions is unambiguously welfare-enhancing, this may not
be so if previously existing restrictions reflected a second-best response to other distortions in
the economy -- e.g., the financial-market distortions mentioned above.
2.  The empirical evidence: the literature
 Much of the systematic empirical work on the issue of causation has focused on 
identifying whether the changes that triggered the recent capital-inflow episodes originated in
7the creditor or debtor countries. This subsection provides an overview of the main findings of
this literature.
i. Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993)
  In an early paper, Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (CLR, 1993) tended to emphasize the
role of external factors in driving capital inflows.  Their formal analysis takes the following
form:
a. Principal component analysis establishes a significant degree of comovement among
foreign reserves and real exchange rates for ten Latin American countries during 1990-91.  The
first principal component explains a larger share of the variation in the ten reserve and real
exchange rate series during 1990-91 than in 1988-89.  For the rate of inflation, however, the
extent of comovement diminished in the more recent period.
b. The first principal components of both the reserve and real exchange rate series display a
large bivariate correlation with several U.S. financial variables used as indicators of  foreign
rates of return.
c. In individual countries, Granger-causality tests most frequently had reserves causing real
exchange rates than the reverse.  This pattern also held for the first principal components of the
two sets of series.
d. Structural VARs involving reserves, real exchange rates, and the first two principal
components of the U.S. financial variables, suggested that the foreign factors exerted causal
influences over the domestic variables, and both variance decompositions and impulse response
functions indicated that the foreign factors played a large role in accounting for reserve and real
exchange rate movements.
ii. Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1993)
8Chuhan, Claessens and Mamingi (CCM, 1993) attempted to disentangle the roles of
domestic and external factors in motivating portfolio capital inflows.  Using monthly bond and
equity flows from the U.S. to nine Latin American and nine Asian countries over the period
January 1988 to July 1992, they estimated separate panel regressions explaining bond and equity
flows as functions of country-specific variables (country credit rating, price of debt on the
secondary market, price earnings ratio in the domestic stock market, and the black market
premium) as well as external variables (U.S. interest rates and U.S. industrial activity).  They
found that bond flows (but not equity flows) responded strongly to the country credit rating,
while price-earning ratios were uniformly important.  However, U.S. interest rates also entered
significantly with the theoretically expected negative sign in all the regressions.  To assess the
relative importance of domestic and foreign variables, they computed the sum of standardized
coefficients for the two sets of variables, finding that domestic and external variables have been
about equally important in Latin America, but domestic variables had sums of standardized
coefficients that were three to four times larger than those of external variables in Asia for both
bond and equity flows.
iii. Fernandez-Arias (1994)
A recent paper by Fernandez-Arias (1994) addressed some of the limitations of both the
original CLR study as well as that of CCM, and at the same time considered some of the less
formal arguments presented by other observers in support of an important role for domestic
factors.  Like CCM, Fernandez-Arias relied on data that measure capital movements directly,
rather than on proxies in the form of reserve and real exchange rate changes, as in CLR. 
However, he argued that the attribution of variation in country-specific financial variables to
domestic shocks in CCM is improper, and in particular that country creditworthiness, as
9indicated by the price of debt on secondary markets, is itself heavily dependent on external
factors.
Fernandez-Arias provides a useful analytical framework within which to consider the
capital-inflows issue.  Capital flows are assumed to potentially occur in the form of transactions
in various classes of assets, indexed by s, where s = 1,..n.  The domestic return on an asset of
type s is decomposed into a "project" expected return Ds and a "country creditworthiness"
adjustment factor Cs, which is bounded between zero and one.  The project return depends
inversely on the vector F of net flows to projects of all types (based on a diminishing marginal
productivity argument), while the creditworthiness factor is a negative function of the vector of
the end-of-period stocks of liabilities of all types, denoted S.  Voluntary capital flows
(components of the vector F) are determined by the arbitrage condition:
                                    Ds(d,F)Cs(c,S-1 + F) = Rs(R),  (1)
where Rs is the opportunity cost of funds of type s in the creditor country, taken to depend on
creditor country financial conditions R, while c and d are shift factors associated with country
creditworthiness and with the domestic economic climate, respectively.  The convention
adopted is that the functions Ds, Cs, and Rs are increasing in these shift parameters.  Notice that
in this framework capital flows will be determined by c, d, and R-- i.e., by domestic factors that
operate at the project and country levels, as well as by external financial factors.  The
assumptions made above imply that the components of the vector F are increasing in d and c,
but decreasing in R and S-1.  
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The country creditworthiness factor c is taken as reflecting the expected present value of
resources available for external payments.  If such resources grow at rate g from an initial value
W, c is given by:
                                        c = W/(I-g), (2) 
where I s a long-term risk-free external interest rate. When creditworthiness is sufficiently low,
the solution to equation (1) above may entail extremely low capital inflows or capital outflows
(negative values of various components of F) of a magnitude that imply transfers of resources
that the country is unwilling to undertake.  In this case, voluntary capital flows of such types
would cease, and the condition would become an inequality no longer determining the
corresponding (involuntary) capital flows.  This observation is important for explaining how
inflows could be externally driven, yet not uniform across developing countries.  In a world in
which some countries are creditworthy and others are not, a reduction in R would generate
increased capital flows only for those countries that met the creditworthiness requirement.
Fernandez-Arias used this model to decompose post-1989 portfolio (bond and equity)
inflows for 13 developing countries into portions attributable to changes in c, d, and R (he
found that changes in S-1 made no contribution to explaining changes in flows).  He did so by
regressing deviations in such flows from their 1989 values on corresponding deviations in the
external interest rate and in the price of debt on the secondary market (based on a simple
burdensharing model that linked c to this variable), using fixed-effect panel estimates for which
the intercept term was interpreted as the change in the domestic investment climate d.  For the
"average" developing country in the sample, changes in international interest rates proved to be
the dominant force in explaining surges in capital inflows, accounting for over 60 percent of the
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deviation in such flows from the 1989 level.  An extra 25 percent was due to changes in
creditworthiness, leaving only about 12 percent to be explained by improvements in the
domestic investment climate.  Moreover, when account is taken of the role of external interest
rates in determining the secondary-market debt price used as the creditworthiness indicator,
thereby decomposing the latter into domestic and foreign components, fully 86 percent of the
surge in inflows is attributed to movements in external interest rates.
iv. Dooley, Fernandez-Arias, and Kletzer  (1994)
A somewhat different approach is followed by DFK based on the above-mentioned
decomposition of creditworthiness into domestic and foreign components. They argue that the
price of commercial-bank debt is a sensitive proxy for capital inflows, because shifts in the
demand for claims on developing countries, whether emanating from changes in domestic or
external factors, should be reflected in these prices. Thus, rather than explaining capital inflows
directly, they attempt to account for the behavior of secondary-market prices on debt since
1989 which, consistent with their interpretation of the relationship between such prices and
capital flows, have risen markedly.  They find that essentially all of the increase in price can be
accounted for by reductions in the face value of debt and international interest rates, leaving
almost nothing to be explained by improvements in the domestic environment.
v. Schadler, Carkovic, Bennett, and Kahn (1993)
These findings concerning  the role of foreign factors have not gone unchallenged,
however.  SCBK, for example,  argue that, while foreign phenomena may have been important,
such influences cannot be regarded as dominant, for several reasons:
a. First, it maintains that the timing of the relevant changes in external factors did not
coincide with that of the inflows.
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b. Second, it notes that the timing, persistence, and intensity of inflows has varied
considerably  across countries that have received inflows, suggesting that investors have
responded to changes in country-specific factors over time.
c. Third, it points out that surges in capital inflows have not been universal within regions of
developing countries, so that external creditors have clearly exercised some cross-country 
discrimination in the allocation of funds.
vi.  Hernandez and Rudolf (1994)
More systematic evidence supporting a role for domestic factors in attracting capital
inflows was provided by Hernandez and Rudolf (1994).  Noting that previous work tended not
to provide a careful specification of domestic factors, Hernandez and Rudolf examined the
extent to which standard creditworthiness indicators could explain long-term capital inflows for
a sample of 22 developing countries over the period 1986-93.  They used two methodologies:
a. First, they split their sample of countries into groups of high capital inflow recipients
(HCIR) and low capital inflow recipients (LCIR).  They found that the former had domestic
saving rates twice as large as the latter, invested a much larger proportion of GNP, exhibited
significantly lower fiscal deficits and inflation rates, had lower stocks of debt as well as larger
stocks of foreign exchange reserves and faster rates of export growth.  The HCIR countries
were also more stable, in the sense that they both exhibited lower variability of inflation and real
exchange rates and scored lower on a political risk index.
b. Second, arranging their data into a panel of annual observations, the estimated capital-
flow  equations for a broad category of  long-term flows as a function of lagged domestic
consumption and investment rates, external interest rates and the ratio of net external debt
(gross debt minus foreign exchange reserves) to GNP, the variability of the real exchange rate,
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and the presence of a Brady bond deal.  They found statistically significant (albeit not very
precisely estimated) role for domestic creditworthiness indicators, but no role for the external
interest rate.
vii.  World Bank (1997)
Recently, the World Bank (1997) has suggested that the factors driving inflows may have
been changing over time, and in particular that domestic factors may have played a more
prominent role during 1994-95.  Adopting the CLR methodology, the Bank found that quarterly
portfolio flows from the United States to 12 emerging markets in East Asia and Latin America
were characterized by a susbtantial amount of comovement (measured by the proportion of the
variation captured by the first principal component) during 1990-93, and that the first principal
component of these series was highly negatively correlated with the first principal component of
a set of representative U.S. asset returns.  Both of these findings are consistent with the findings
of CLR for this period, as described above.  However, over the years 1993-95, comovements
among portfolio flows became much weaker (the contribution of the first principal component
drops to 45 percent, from 75 percent of the variance), and the correlation with U.S. asset
returns reversed signs and became much weaker.  The implication is that idiosyncratic country
factors may have played a much larger role in recent years than they did in the early years of the
inflow episode.
3. An Evaluation
The formal evidence strongly  supports the "push" view  that  falling U.S. interest rates
have played an important role in driving capital flows to developing countries.  The two
contrary bits of evidence in CCM (1993) and SCBK (1993) are open to question.  In the case of
the former, the classification of creditworthiness as a domestic factor is clearly questionable.  In
  1/   This evidence is also at odds with the results of  Calvo and Reinhart (1996), who find that the U.S. interest rate is also
significant over longer sample periods (1970-1993 in their case) in explaining capital flows to a panel of 11 Latin American
countries.
  2/  The empirical importance of domestic economic and political factors in explaining FDI has also been stressed by
Edwards (1990).
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that of the latter, while the timing of capital flows to some East Asian developing countries may
have preceded the easing of monetary policy in the United States, the timing of  U.S.  interest
rate decreases  clearly does fit quite closely that of the advent of capital flows to developing
countries as a group.   While the short-term interest rate in the U.S. trended downward during
1989-90, sharp decreases occurred both at the beginning of 1991 and 1992, and in both
instances coincided with increases in capital flows during the subsequent year.  Moreover, while
it is true that not all countries have been recipients of the new inflows, it is also true that flows
have not been restricted to countries with well-established track records of macroeconomic and
structural adjustment.  Both Peru and Brazil, for instance, received substantial inflows in 1992,
while both countries still confronted severe macroeconomic imbalances.
The strongest evidence for the “pull” view during the early years of the inflow episode is
that provided by Hernandez and Rudolf (1994).  However, their evidence is not necessarily
inconsistent with the “push” view, despite the poor performance of the U.S. interest rate in their
capital-flow regressions.1/  Specifically, their focus on long-term capital flows and the weight
given to the 1990-86 period in their data suggest that their results may primarily apply to FDI
flows and are not necessarily applicable to other types of capital flows, such as portfolio or
short-term flows.2/
However, the apparent importance of "push" factors does not preclude the relevance of
"pull" phenomena.  The complementarity between the two explanations is formalized in
equation (1).  Indeed, while "push" factors may drive the timing and magnitude of the new
  1/  An important exception is World Bank (1997).
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capital inflows, this is not incompatible with a role for "pull" factors in explaining the
geographic distribution of flows during this time.  Differences in capital inflow levels across
countries indeed point to the importance of such country-specific factors.
 More importantly, in our view the “push” story remains incomplete.  Empirically,
external-source shocks have been proxied by foreign rates of return.  The role of structural
changes in creditor-country financial  markets that have eased access to such markets by
developing-country borrowers has not been considered in such tests. As suggested previously,
the existing literature has not drawn a sharp distinction between changes in the degree of
financial integration and changes in relative ex ante rates of return. 1/  The "push" story based
on low U.S. interest rates fails to address this issue.   To the extent that the new flows are
driven by "permanent" changes in the degree of world financial integration they are less likely to
be reversed than if they are driven by temporarily low U.S. interest rates.  These gaps in the
existing literature suggest that it may be useful to revisit the issue with a more satisfactory
characterization of of "pull" factors, with a specific focus on factors that affect the degree of
financial integration, and with attention paid to both the time-series and cross-section aspects of
the inflow phenomenon.
III.  The Size and Composition of Capital Inflows: Recent Developments
In the conventional wisdom, inflows into Asian countries are perceived as dominated by
foreign direct investment, while those into Latin America are more heavily oriented toward
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short-term flows.   The aim of this section is to assess the extent to which this conventional
wisdom tends to oversimplify the dynamics of capital flows during the present decade.  
1.  Updating the stylized facts: cross-country comparisons
The description of emerging-market capital inflow experience in this section is based on a
sample of 15 such countries, including five in Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, and Thailand), six in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and
Mexico), and four from other regions (Czech Republic, Egypt, Kenya, and Uganda).  The
capital-inflow data is from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook data set.  Capital flows in this
data set are classified into five categories: portfolio flows (bonds and equity), short-term flows,
FDI, other long-term flows, and errors and omissions.  The capital-inflow experience for each of
the countries is described in Tables 1-3. The first table shows net capital inflows as a percent of
GDP, while the subsequent ones show portfolio (bonds and equity) and short-term inflows,
respectively, also as a share of GDP.  
As can be seen from Table 1, the magnitude of total flows (relative to GDP) was
substantially larger for Asian countries than for the Latin American countries.  On average,
capital inflows in the former amounted to over 7 percent of GDP, while in the latter they fell
short of 4 percent of GDP.  Moreover, relative to GDP, the magnitude of short-term flows was
also larger in Asia than in Latin America, at 2.8 percent and 1.3 percent of GDP, respectively. 
Since the difference in magnitude of short-term flows was proportionately larger than that for
the overall capital account, Asian countries actually registered a slightly larger share of short-
term flows in total capital inflows (39 versus 32 percent) over the period as a whole, contrary to
conventional wisdom. Thus, it does not appear to have been the case that Latin America has 
  1/  This greater volatility/instability is also evident in a broad variety of macroeconomic and
financial variables (see Kaminsky and Reinhart (1995)).
  2/  See Calvo and Reinhart (1996) and Frankel and Schmuckler (1996) on this issue reviewing a variety of higher frequency
data.
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received differentially larger amounts of short-term capital than have Asian countries, at least
during the current decade.  It is also worth noting that short-term flows were already important
in Asia by 1990, so these are not a new phenomenon to the region.  In contrast, short-term
flows only became important in Latin America in the more recent period.
On the other hand, the conventional wisdom is not totally without basis.  First, as shown
in Table 2, portfolio flows -- which may share many of the characteristics of short-term flows --
have indeed played a more substantial role in most of the Latin American countries in our
sample than in other regions.  Second, short-term capital has apparently tended to be more
skittish in Latin America than in Asia.  As shown in Montiel and Reinhart (1999), while short-
term capital has been more volatile (as measured by the coefficient of variation) than all other
types of capital flows (defined residually) in both regions, the difference in the coefficient of
variation between short-term and other types of capital flows, which was quite small in Asia,
was much more substantial in Latin America, differing by a factor of three.  Indeed, the volatility
of overall capital inflows between the two regions is entirely accounted for by the volatility of
short-term capital in Latin America.  The coefficients of variation of both short-term and long-
term flows in Asia, as well as that of all other types of flows in Latin America are in the
neighborhood of 20 percent, while that of short-term flows in Latin America approaches 70
percent.1/  Finally, for the Asian countries there is little evidence of “Tequila effects” in the
annual data.2/ While short-term flows have remained below their 1993 peak through 1996, this
was dominated by the experience of Malaysia, where internal policy changes appear to have
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played a major role.  In contrast with this experience, capital flows to Latin America fell in
1994.  
    IV. The Policy Response in Shaping the Volume and Composition of Flows
 Among the findings discussed in Section II was that idiosyncratic, country-specific
factors may have played a larger role in driving capital inflows during recent years than they had
in the early 1990s.  This section examines how the domestic policy response to the surge in
capital inflows--specifically the reliance on sterilized intervention (tight monetary policy) and
capital controls to avoid overheating--has influenced the subsequent volume and composition of
capital flows.
A relevant preliminary question is, of course, to assess whether the composition of flows
matters.  Thus, we first review what the literature has to say on this issue before turning to the
empirical evidence.
1. Does the composition matter?
The composition of capital flows may matter for a variety of reasons.  First, certain types
of flows may be more stable than others.  The conventional wisdom places FDI at the most
stable end of the spectrum, and short-term flows at the opposite extreme.  Second, even if the
stability characteristics are uniform, the implications for macroeconomic adjustment may be
quite different.  For instance, several observers have argued that FDI inflows to Asia have
tended to finance increases in domestic investment with a high imported capital content.  Even if
the scale of domestic investment is unaffected by the arrival of FDI, investment by foreign firms
may be more productive than domestic firms.  Finally, different types of flows may vary in their
  1/   See Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1997) for a review of this literature.
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implications for domestic financial stability.  For example, the emergence of real estate or stock
market bubbles may be more likely if foreign creditors either seek to hold equity shares or real
estate directly or if they seek to hold shares on domestic intermediaries that themselves finance
the acquisition of stocks or real estate.
There is (weak) empirical evidence in favor of the first two of these propositions, and
only impressionistic evidence regarding the third.  The conventional wisdom that FDI is a more
stable source of capital than short-term or portfolio flows has been challenged by Claessens,
Dooley, and Werner (1995), who showed that the time series properties of the two types of
flows were similar.  The CDW view, however, has not carried the day, and the conventional
wisdom retain many adherents.  The evidence in support of this view is of two types.  First,
there is direct evidence on the relative volatility of FDI compared to other types of flows. 
Second, studies of the determinants of currency crises keep turning up evidence that
incriminates short-term external liabilities in such crises.1/
Regarding the first, a comparison by the World Bank (1997) of the quarterly volatility of
FDI and portfolio flows for eight major capital inflow recipient countries during the 1990s
(measured by the coefficient of variation of the series) yielded higher volatility estimates for
portfolio flows in six of the eight countries examined.  In four of the six cases in which portfolio
flows were more volatile than FDI, the coefficient of variation of the portfolio flows was more
than twice as high as that of the corresponding FDI series.
With regard to the empirical studies of the determinants of financial crises, a large wave
of such research was triggered by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and Mexican financial
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crises.  Several papers in this literature have found evidence that short-term capital inflows have
played a role in increasing the probability of subsequent financial crises.  Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco (1996), for instance, found that the change in short-term inflows over 1990-94 helped
to predict changes in a composite financial crisis index which they constructed to measure the
incidence of “tequila effects” in the aftermath of the Mexican financial crisis.  Similarly, Frankel
and Rose (1996) found that the composition of debt can help predict the likelihood of a
currency crisis; they find that the countries that experienced crashes tended to have a higher
share of their debt on variable rate terms and at short maturities than those that did not, as well
as to exhibit a disproportionally small share of FDI in total capital flows.
2. Countercyclical policies and the composition of flows
If the composition of inflows matters for macroeconomic performance, then it becomes of
interest to determine whether the volume and composition of capital inflows responds
endogenously to the policy stance adopted by recipient countries.  More often than not during
the 1990s, these policies have attempted to dampen overheating in response to external financial
shocks.  Theory suggests that an endogenous policy response is to be expected.  In the most
obvious way, domestic policy might be designed precisely to feed back to the volume and
composition of inflows, as in the use of capital controls.  Less obviously, the  policy mix
adopted to restrain an expansion in aggregate demand in response to capital inflows may itself
affect the volume and composition of inflows.  In this subsection we investigate these issues
empirically, testing the impacts of capital account restrictions, as well as of sterilized
intervention, on the volume and composition of capital inflows, while controlling for "push"
factors such as the levels of international interest rates.
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Our tests are based on the panel data set described in the previous section, covering 15
emerging markets over the 1990-1996 period.  We extend Montiel and Reinhart (1999) by sub-
dividing the sample into two groups.  A Latin American group, which is comprised of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico, while the second group is
primarily, but not exclusively comprised of Asian countries, including Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. We focus on the effects of the variables of interest on
portfolio flows (bonds and equity), short-term flows, FDI, and the overall capital account
balance.  Our measures of sterilization and the intensity of capital controls consist of country-
and time-specific indices described in Montiel and Reinhart (1999).  Our domestic policy indices
range from 0 to 2 in both cases, with higher values corresponding to more intensive use of
capital controls and more aggressive sterilization.  We estimate a set of fixed-effects panel
regressions explaining the volume and composition of various types of capital inflows as a
function of the intensity of sterilization, the severity of capital account restrictions, the yield on a
three-month U.S. Treasury bills, a comparable Japanese interest rate, and a "tequila effect"
dummy.  In our estimation strategy, we employ instrumental variables, as our policy proxies are
potentially endogenous variables, to the extent that these policies were adopted in response to a
surge in capital inflows. The results of the panel regressions corrected for the presence of
heteroskedastic disturbances are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
The second and third columns of the tables report the effects of the domestic policy
variables on the volume and composition of capital inflows.  The next three columns examine
“push” factors, in the form of external interest rates and a Mexico crisis dummy variable that
takes up the issue of contagion.  The top five rows report the effects of the policy action on the
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volume of flows as a share of GDP, while the two bottom rows report the effects on the
composition of flows.  
As can be seen by inspection of the second column, an intensification in the degree of
monetary sterilization is associated with an increase in the volume of aggregate capital inflows,
operating primarily through inflows of short-term capital, since the effect of the sterilization
proxy in the FDI and portfolio capital regressions was not statistically significant.  This result is
robust in both regions, with the predominantly Asian sample showing a higher degree of
sensitivity to sterilization policies than their Latin American counterparts.  The last two rows
confirm that tight monetary policy tends to skew the composition of inflows towards short-term
and portfolio flows.  
 However, it is less clear that the volume of inflows has been significantly affected by
capital-account restrictions in either region, although there is some weak evidence presented in
Table 5 that controls may have had some effect in reducing short-term flows in the Asian
sample.  Except for FDI flows (which have been exempt from these measures), the coefficients
on the index of capital control intensity, listed in the third columns of Table 4 and 5, are
predominantly negative.  None of them, however, is statistically significant even at the 90
percent confidence level.  On the other hand, the two bottom rows of the tables suggest that the
imposition or intensification of controls on inflows may indeed be associated with a change in
the composition of flows resulting in a significantly  lower share of short-term and portfolio
flows and a higher share of FDI.  While the reduction in the share of short-term and portfolio
flows is statistically significant at standard confidence levels, the impact on the share of FDI is
not significant, although the sign is positive, consistent with prior expectations.  Taken together,
the preponderance of  negative point estimates on inflow volume for flows targeted by
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restrictions and statistically significant effects on the composition of flows in the intended
direction, together suggest that explicit capital inflow restrictions may have been effective in
altering the composition of capital inflows.
With regard to the control variables we find, consistent with the results of others, that
declines in international interest rates significantly increase the overall volume of inflows to
emerging markets.  The effect both in Asia and Latin America appears to operate primarily
through portfolio bond and equity  flows.  Somewhat surprisingly, we could not identify a
significant effect of changes in international interest rates on short-term flows for either sample. 
While these results are common to both regions, interesting regional differences also emerge. 
First, flows to Latin America appear to be more sensitive to international interest rates,
consistent with some of the earlier findings of Chuhan, Claessens, and Mamingi (1996), which
argued that domestic factors played a more prominent role in attracting funds to Asia.  Second,
there appear to be stronger intra-regional financial links than inter-regional links, flows to Latin
America are more influenced by U.S. interest rates, while Japanese interest rate play a more
significant role for Asia.  As to the composition effects, international interest rates do not
appear to influence the composition of flows in a significant or clear manner, despite the fact
that they do significantly impact the volume in both Asia and Latin America.
Lastly, as a byproduct of this estimation, we obtain an indication of the generalized
incidence of persistent “tequila effects.”  Because the number of annual observations is limited,
it is important to control for time-specific shocks of this type in assessing the effects of domestic
policy on the variables that are primary interest.  At the same time the inclusion of at least two
policy dimensions of the domestic policy response in the regression controls for a subset of the
domestic “fundamentals” driving capital flows, and thus allows us to get to a measure of pure
  1/  Less persistent contagion effects are more likely to be more easily detected in high frequency data, as following the
Mexican crisis the effects on other countries were mostly confined to the first quarter of 1995.
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“contagion” effects than would be possible with before-after comparisons of post-Mexico
changes in the level and/or composition of capital inflows.  We found selective evidence of
persistent contagion effects strongly suggesting, as other studies have done, that contagion
tends to be more regional than global in scope.1/  For Latin America, the coefficients had the
anticipated sign, with overall inflows declining significantly in 1995 because of a proportionately
larger decline in decline in portfolio flows.  FDI seem little affected (the coefficient is negative
but not statistically significant), supporting the view that FDI is somewhat more resilient and
less vulnerable to sudden reversals.  For Asia, none of the coefficients on the Mexican crisis
dummy variable registered statistical significance.  
V. Capital Inflows and Financial Markets
The analysis in the two previous sections took the standard macroeconomic approach of
implicitly assuming that a smoothly functioning financial system would appropriately
intermediate capital flows, so that no additional complications arise from this source.  In
practice, however, the functioning of the domestic financial system may magnify the scale of
short-term capital movements, as well as determine the extent of macroeconomic disruption
created by a given degree of short-term capital volatility.  This section examines the links
between domestic financial intermediation and the role played by existing capital markets in
determining the volume of short-term and portfolio capital movements. The first part takes up
the analytical links among macroeconomic performance, financial-sector performance, and
capital inflows associated with the advent of financial openess.  The second part provides an
  1/  Domestic savers may turn to informal and/or foreign intermediaries.
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empirical examination of the composition of capital inflows as related to the characteristics of
the financial system in our sample of countries.
1. Distortions in the Domestic Financial System and Capital Flows
i. Underintermediation
The term underintermediation refers to a situation in which the volume of domestic
resources channeled through the domestic financial system is lessthan optimal.  The financial
system may provide insufficient intermediation if it offers excessively low returns to domestic
savers, thereby restricting the scale of formal domestic intermediation artificially.1  A situa on
where the domestic financial system offers excessively low returns could originate inside the
financial system itself, through the influence of the macroeconomic environment, or indirectly
through the effects of the policies adopted toward the financial system.
For example, a situation in which a few large banks exercise monopoly power in the
domestic financial system could result in large spreads between deposit and lending rates that
could partly take the form of low deposit rates.  This is essentially a microeconomic
phenomenon, related to the industrial organization of the financial sector, but it would have
macroeconomic effects through the channels described above.  
Underintermediation could also arise, however, even when domestic institutions would
otherwise be functioning competitively and efficiently, if the macroeconomic environment
creates the expectation on the part of savers that their assets may be vulnerable to various types
of explicit or implicit taxation if placed with the domestic financial system.  The presence of an
unresolved domestic or external public-sector debt overhang, or the existence of any other
  1/   The system may not be able to compensate savers for such risk without becoming insolvent, if the risk emerges in a
situation in which bank assets are tied up in long-term low-yielding assets.  A discussion of the links between a micro model
of banking and the macroeconomy is provided in Reinhart and Reinhart (1996).
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unsustainable macroeconomic condition that appears to call for a large fiscal adjustment creates
expropriation risk attached to all domestic assets, causing depositors to curtail their recurrence
to the formal domestic banking system.  Similarly, an overvalued currency, if accompanied by
the expectation of an exchange rate adjustment, creates the risk of a capital loss on domestic-
currency denominated assets.  To the extent that the domestic financial system does not (or
cannot) compensate savers for bearing such risk, the system would be forced to contract in such
an environment.1
A third mechanism through which underintermediation could arise is through policies
adopted toward the financial sector that distort the returns payable to savers in a downward
direction.  As indicated previously, such policies often arise in response to other aspects of the
domestic macroeconomic environment.   Fiscal rigidity (an inadequate tax base and an inflexible
expenditure structure), for example, tends to create incentives to tax the formal financial system
through financial repression.  High reserve/liquidity requirements and controlled interest rates
hold down the government’s borrowing costs by effectively taxing the financial system.  The
effect is to lower the return to savers, thus causing the formal financial system to contract,
through the disintermediation phenomenon described above.  In this case, domestic financial
institutions pay excessively low returns to savers not because of the industrial organization of
the sector or the inability of banks to compensate savers for macroeconomic risks, but simply
because they are legally prohibited from raising interest rates or, even if legally able to, are
prevented from doing so by the high costs of carrying unremunerated required reserves.
ii. Overintermediation
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Underintermediation has been the problem that most concerned observers of developing-
country financial markets until recently.  Of late, however, become evident that
overintermediation is possible in liberalized financial systems. Overintermediation arises when
savers receive “excessively high” returns on their placements in the domestic financial system. 
“Excessively high” in this context means that the returns offered to savers by the domestic
financial system exceed the social rates of return that financial institutions can generate from
their portfolios. Overintermediation arises from a combination of micro and macroeconomic
phenomena.  One possibility is that banks, which have low net worth relative to the value of
their deposits, can issue deposits that are either explicitly or implicitly insured by the
government on terms that do not adequately reflect the risk structure of bank assets, and
supervisory as well as regulatory capacities are weak.  This situation creates well-known moral
hazard problems for bank managers, causing them to attract deposits by offering high interest
rates and using the proceeds to fund high-risk investments.
2. Links to capital flows and macroeconomic performance
Shocks which originate in the financial sector can have macroeconomic effects through a
variety of mechanisms. Two such mechanisms have been of importance recently: the emergence
of  lending booms and the existence of unresolved financial-sector insolvency.  The first is an
example of overintermediation while the latter would result in underintermediation.  In each
case, the banking system may itself have been the originator of the shock, or it may have
originated elsewhere and taken on macroeconomic importance primarily because of its financial-
sector implications.   It may be worth emphasizing that what is generated in each case is
macroeconomic instability, but this can take on a variety of forms.  We argue below that lending
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booms tend to be associated with boom-bust cycles while unresolved financial-sector solvency
problems are likely to be associated with macroeconomic stagnation.
As noted earlier, improperly-priced explicit or implicit deposit guarantees create moral
hazard problems for bank managers acting on behalf of bank shareholders.  Under these
circumstances, bank managers have an incentive to attract resources away from the rest of the
economy and from abroad by offering high deposit interest rates, and to use these resources to
fund high-risk projects and/or consumption booms.  This problem is more acute the lower is the
net worth of bank shareholders (the lower the banks' capital-asset ratio), and it calls for pricing
deposit insurance according to the risk characteristics as a first-best policy, or for active bank
supervision as a second-best measure. This situation will usually be associated with a surge in
short-term capital inflows and adverse effects on macroeconomic stability.  Such
overintermediation has the potential to cause a rapid expansion of the domestic financial system,
setting off asset-price bubbles through lending for real estate and stock speculation, and
triggering consumption booms that may potentially destabilize aggregate demand.  The likely
short-run macroeconomic consequences include rising inflation, large current account deficits,
and real exchange rate appreciation.
The emergence of lending booms may have other macroeconomic effects beyond their
tendency to stimulate booms in economic activity.  Gavin and Hausman (1995) note that
financial crises are typically preceded by lending booms.  They argue that these phenomena are
related through the effects of rapid growth of banks’ portfolios on the quality of those
portfolios.  Essentially, rapid expansion makes it harder for banks to get information about the
quality of assets, in part because liquidity-based solvency tests are easily met by borrowers when
times are good and overall bank credit is expanding.  Thus, rapid growth in lending causes the
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average quality of banks’ portfolios to deteriorate.  From the perspective of short-run stability,
what is important is that this may lay the seeds of a future reversal of the cycle by saddling
banks with assets of poor quality.  Thus, a boom-bust cycle is implied, rather than merely a
transitory boom.
The severity of this boom cycle is likely to depend on the openness of the capital account
and will also be a function of the exchange rate regime.  When the capital account is open, the
scope for bank expansion is increased by the ability of banks to attract external funds,
particularly if deposit guarantees are perceived to apply to foreign depositors.  The effect of
deposit insurance in the context of an open capital account is to safeguard the domestic-
currency value of the claims acquired by foreign depositors on domestic banks.  If this is
coupled with an exchange-rate guarantee in the form of a fixed exchange rate, the foreign-
currency value of these claims is safeguarded as well, and the cost of attracting external funds
will be lowered for banks as long as the exchange rate is credible.
In contrast with the boom-bust cycle implied by lending booms, the macroeconomic
effects of a domestic debt overhang problem arising from financial-sector insolvency would be
similar to those that are familiar from the literature on the overhang of external debt.  In
particular, this situation would tend to deter private investment.  If real capital investment is
largely irreversible, the potential of large future tax liabilities is likely to cause private agents to
exercise their option to wait before committing capital to the domestic economy--the
implications being slow growth of productive capacity and deficient aggregate demand.
If the economy is opened up financially in the midst of a “debt overhang” problem of this
type, the likely effect is to trigger capital outflows, just as any other large unfunded government
liability would tend to do.  From the perspective of macroeconomic stability, the effect is that a
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banking crisis could directly trigger a balance of payments crisis under such circumstances.  If
the exchange rate is flexible, the likely outcome instead is a collapse of the value of the domestic
currency.
3. The financial sector and capital flows: the empirical evidence
The previous two subsections have raised several conceptual issues regarding how the
structure, practices, and health of the banking sector and the capital market may shape the
volume and types of capital a country attracts.  It was argued that countries which have
unresolved debt problems, underintermediation and capital outflows (or, at best, limited inflows)
are likely to follow.  By contrast, overintermediation is likely to be associated with credit
booms, asset price bubbles, and surges in capital inflows--particularly short-term and portfolio
flows.  Furthermore, it was noted that overintermediation may be more likely in countries with
more developed capital markets--that is, there is some minimum infrastructure in bond and
equity markets required to promote portfolio flows, which in turn, could add fuel to asset price
bubbles.  In other words, to invest in bonds and stocks you need to have a stock and bond
market in the first place. 
In this subsection we investigate  some of these propositions empirically. To examine
whether there is a systematic link between capital flows and the structure of the capital market,
we introduce a variety of possible proxies for the size and depth of the domestic capital market. 
The three variables we consider are: the market capitalization of the equity market (in U.S.
dollars), the number of listed companies in the stock exchange, and the trading value (in U.S.
dollars). All the data comes from the International Finance Corporation.  While these variables
directly describe the equity market, they are also likely to proxy indirectly for the size of the
  1/  Of course, in developing countries the bulk of the financing is done through the banking sector rather than the equity or
bond market, hence the former tends to be large relative large (see Rojas Suarez and Weisbrod (1994)).  
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banking sector, as typically countries with undeveloped capital markets also tend to have a
smaller financial sector.1/
We include these equity market indicators one at a time.  The remaining explanatory
variables are the sterilized intervention index, the capital control index, and the foreign interest
rates.  The “post-Mexico” dummy was dropped for the predominantly Asian sample, as it was
not statistically significant in any of the previous regressions.  Because it has sometimes been
argued that capital inflows may themselves lead to an expansion in the domestic banking sector
and/or a deepening of the capital market, we treat these equity market indicators as endogenous
and use an instrumental variables estimator.  As before, we use a fixed effects estimator and
correct for the presence of heteroskedastic disturbances.
For both regions we report the results for each equity market depth measure in Tables 6-
8.  Since portfolio flows, not surprisingly, appear to have the closest link to the stock market
variables, these are the results we focus on in this section.  For the Latin American sample, both
market capitalization and number of listed stocks are statistically significant with the anticipated
positive sign.  Indeed, these variables were also significant in explaining total flows to the Latin
American sample–but had little explanatory power in accounting for short-term flows. 
Interestingly, the inclusion of these proxies for capital market depth increases the precision with
which the capital control dummy is estimated.  In two of the three specifications, the coefficient
on the capital control proxy is now statistically significant.  The results are regards the
importance of U.S. interest rates remains robust across specifications.
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By contrast, none of the variables that proxy for capital market depth were statistically
significant in the regressions explaining portfolio flows to Asia and other regions.  Indeed, as
regards the importance of Japanese interest rates and the domestic policy variables, the results
summarized in Tables 6-8 mimic those of the previous section in nearly every aspect.
VI. Concluding Observations
This paper has attempted to fill some of the holes in the existing literature on the causes
and determinants of capital flows by explicitly considering the role played by countercyclical
policies and by financial sector development.  We have focused on two types of countercyclical
policies: sterilized intervention, which was the most common policy response to the arrival of
capital inflows among the countries considered in this study, and restrictions on capital inflows
designed to discourage short-term and/or portfolio flows.  Our empirical methodology exploited
both the time-series and cross-section dimensions of the data, and incorporated control variables
intended to capture "push" factors, including possible contagion effects associated with the
1994 Mexican currency crisis.  We examined the extent to whether there were regional
similarities–or differences–in the determinants of capital flows to Asia and Latin America.
Based on the experiences of the 15 countries in our sample, we find broad evidence that
capital flows, some types more than others, do indeed respond to the short-run macroeconomic
policies of the capital-importing country.  Our findings can be summarized as follows:
! Sterilized intervention has tended to increase the volume of total capital inflows.  This
effect has operated, in particular, through short-term capital, as portfolio flows and FDI
do not appear to be responsive to the degree of sterilization efforts.  This result is
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common to both groups of countries, but sterilization seems to have acted as a greater
“pull” factor in Asia than in Latin America.
! Sterilized intervention significantly alters the composition of capital flows, increasing the
share of short-term and portfolio flows.
! We could find no statistically significant effect of restrictions on capital inflows on the
overall volume of flows. Though our coefficient estimates were negative, indicating that
an intensification of such restrictions tended to discourage inflows, these effects were
estimated with poor statistical precision.  There is some weak evidence that the controls
may have been more effective in curbing short term flows in the Asian sample and
portfolio flows in the Latin American sample.
! We found stronger evidence, however, that such restrictions are capable of altering  the
composition of capital flows in the intended direction of reducing the relative weight of
short-maturity debt instruments. 
We also considered the roles of domestic "pull" factors of a more structural kind --
specifically, capital market development.  Our principal conclusion in this regard is the
following:
! Of the types of capital flows we considered, portfolio flows appear to be the most
responsive to the size and depth of the equity market.  Both the number of listed
companies in the stock exchange and market valuation are positively linked to portfolio
flows-- suggesting that bond and equity flows gravitate to those countries which have the
more emergent markets.  However, this result, although intuitively appealing, is not
robust across samples, with the capital market indicators only playing a significant role in
Latin America.
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Our results were consistent with the previous literature in confirming the importance of
"push" factors (in the form of U.S. and Japanese interest rates).  While responsiveness to
foreign interest rates is a shared characteristic of both regions, there are also some interesting
regional differences both as regards the choice of the relevant “push” factors, as well as their
relative importance.
 ! Flows to Latin America, particularly portfolio flows, appear to be more sensitive to
international interest rates. 
 ! Second, the evidence presented here suggests that there are stronger intra-regional
financial links than inter-regional links, flows to Latin America are more influenced by
U.S. interest rates, while Japanese interest rate play a more significant role for Asia. 
! Contagion appears to be more regional than global in scope, as there were significant
reduction in the volume of capital inflows (particularly portfolio) to Latin America in the
wake of the Mexican crisis. There was little evidence of any adverse consequences for
capital inflows into Asia from this episode.
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Table 1. Capital Flows as a percent of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Asia 
average 6.2 8.1 6.5 8.9 5.8 7.3 6.6
Indonesia 4.7  0.8 1.3 2.4 0.8 2.5 2.8
Malaysia 4.2          11.7          14.9       16.8 1.8 8.5 6.4
Phillippines 4.0 4.9 1.2 3.7 6.4 5.5 9.2
Sri Lanka    6.9       10.4 6.2        11.5        11.1 6.6 5.0
Thailand    11.4       12.7 8.9        10.0 8.8        13.5 9.3
Latin America
average       3.1 2.1 4.6 5.4 4.2 3.5 4.5
Argentina -0.8 1.3 4.6 4.7 3.8 1.4 3.4
Brazil  1.0 0.0 2.6 1.9 1.3 4.3 4.4
Chile        10.0 2.4 0.7 8.0 8.8 1.7 6.7
Colombia -0.1 2.1 0.0 4.8 4.4 6.2 7.1
Costa Rica 3.8 4.1 6.3 8.0 4.3 3.6 4.5
Mexico  4.5 7.1 7.1 7.3 2.4 4.0 1.2
Other regions 
average     -4.0        -0.7 2.5 4.8 5.0 6.5 3.6
Czech 
Republic  1.1 1.2 3.5 9.7 9.2        17.9 4.6
Egypt       -27.7      -10.1        -0.1 3.8 4.4 1.8 2.8
Kenya         4.7 0.8 1.3 2.4 0.8 2.5 2.8
Uganda      -4.0       -0.7 2.5 4.8 5.0 6.5 3.6
Source: International Monetary Fund, Worl  Economic Outlook
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Table 2. Portfolio Flows as a percent of GDP
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1996
Asia 
average   0.6 0.2 0.7 1.8 0.6 1.2 1.0
Indonesia   0.0  0.0 0.7 1.1 0.6 0.8 0.7
Malaysia   0.0 0.0           2.0 2.5 0.8 1.5 1.3
Phillippines  -0.1 0.3 0.1        - 0.1        0.4 1.6 1.3
Sri Lanka   0.1 0.4 0.3          0.7 0.2 0.0 0.5
Thailand   0.6 0.1 0.5          3.8 0.9 2.0 1.3
Latin America
average       0.2 0.8 1.5 3.5 2.1        -0.5 1.5
Argentina -0.9 0.3          -0.2 9.5 1.3 1.5 3.7
Brazil  0.1 1.0 3.8 2.8 9.1 0.3 0.8
Chile           1.2 0.1 0.8 1.6 1.7 0.3 1.5
Colombia  0.0 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.5        -0.1   1.7
Costa Rica 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mexico  0.5 3.1 4.3 5.8 0.8        -5.0 1.2
Other regions 
average      0.0         0.0 0.0 1.3 0.6 0.8 0.7
Czech 
Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 2.4         3.0 1.9
Egypt 0.0 0.1          0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.0
Kenya 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uganda 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Source: International Monetary Fund, Worl  Economic Outlook
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Table 3. Short-term Capital Flows as a percent of GDP
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Asia 
average 3.0  3.4 3.6 3.0 1.4 2.6 2.6
Indonesia 5.5   3.7 1.5 0.7 1.9 3.9 2.9
Malaysia 1.2            3.9  8.0           8.4        -4.5 1.1 1.5
Phillippines0.9  0.4 2.0 1.0 2.3          -0.5    2.8
Sri Lanka   -0.1           1.71.4           1.9          1.6 1.6 1.0
Thailand      7.6           7.55.0           3.0  5.5              7.7 5.6
Latin America
average        0.6 0.2 2.6 2.0 1.3 1.1 1.0
Argentina -2.7         -0.7 3.7 0.5 0.2         -1.2         -0.6
Brazil  1.0 0.0 2.6 1.9 1.3 4.0 4.0
Chile           4.8 1.4 4.6 2.4 2.6 1.4 0.1
Colombia -0.4          -1.01.2 2.0 1.2 1.4 0.1
Costa Rica 0.9 1.1 3.2 5.0 1.7 1.6 2.7
Mexico  0.2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2         -1.1
Other regions 
average       1.9         0.7    -1.8        -0.3 0.4 1.6          -0.7
Czech 
Republic 0.0         -1.1  0.7          -3.3 1.8           2.1         -1.9
Egypt          2.9         2.2  -1.0 0.6 2.4 0.4  0.5
Kenya 2.2             -0.7  4.1 2.5         -2.8 3.7  2.3
Uganda       2.4              2.5 -10.9         -0.8 0.1 0.0 -3.9
Source: International Monetary Fund, Worl  Economic Outlook
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Table 4. Fixed Effects Estimates, Instrumental Variables: 1990-96
Latin America
Dependent
variable
Sterilization
index
Capital
control proxy
U.S.
interest rate
Japanese
interest rate
Mexican
crisis
dummy
Capital account
as a % of GDP
0.814
(1.947)
-0.058
(-0.129)
-0.393
(-2.273)
-0.321
(-1.468)
-0.921
(-1.993)
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.792
(1.753)
-0.533
(-1.122)
-0.628
(-2.439)
-0.012
(-0.066)
-0.754
(-2.321)
Short-term flows
as a % of GDP
0.281
(2.216)
-0.121
(-0.232)
-0.251
(-1.041)
-0.075
(-0.458)
-0.342
(-1.799)
Portfolio plus
short-term flows 
as a % of GDP
0.708
(1.975)
-0.720
(-1.209)
-0.953
(-2.880)
-0.095
(-0.436)
-0.636
(-2.034)
FDI flows
as a % of GDP
-0.015
(-0.017)
-0.545
(-0.392)
-0.431
(-0.932)
-0.054
(-0.766)
-0.136
(-0.663)
Portfolio plus
short-term flows 
as a% of total
flows
35.544
(2.462)
-14.894
(-1.984)
-154.457
(-1.021)
84.203
(1.118)
n.a.
FDI flows as a
share of total
flows
-24.444
(-1.236)
61.658
(0.758)
43.274
(1.442)
57.756
(1.071)
n.a.
Notes: The countries in the sample are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, and Mexico. The
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been corrected for general forms of
heteroskedasticity. An n.a. denotes not applicable.
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Table 5. Fixed Effects Estimates, Instrumental Variables: 1990-1996
Asia and other regions
Dependent
variable
Sterilization
index
Capital
control proxy
U.S.
interest rate
Japanese
interest rate
Mexican
crisis
dummy
Capital account
as a % of GDP
1.290
(1.514)
-0.356
(-0.217)
-0.263
(-0.499)
-0.488
(-1.972)
0.031
(0.423)
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.193
(1.433)
0.287
(0.701)
-0.026
(-0.317)
-0.112
(-2.499)
-0.024
(-0.522)
Short-term flows
as a % of GDP
1.144
(2.316)
-1.402
(-1.533)
-0.566
(-1.057)
-0.109
(-0.632)
0.012
(0.210)
Portfolio plus
short-term flows 
as a % of GDP
1.117
(2.396)
-0.720
(-1.209)
-0.451
(-1.156)
-0.132
(-0.671)
0.136
(0.831)
FDI flows
as a % of GDP
0.415
(1.012)
1.542
(1.092)
0.023
(0.632)
-0.102
(-0.564)
0.112
(0.462)
Portfolio plus
short-term flows 
as a% of total
flows
25.776
(1.992)
-49.528
(-2.060)
11.523
(0.731)
2.660
(0.332)
n.a.
FDI flows as a
share of total
flows
-36.097
(-1.766)
51.905
(1.335)
2.493
(0.185)
1.554
(1.215)
n.a.
Notes: The countries in the sample are Czech Republic, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Uganda. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been
corrected for general forms of heteroskedasticity. An n.a. denotes not applicable.
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Table 6. Fixed Effects Estimates, Instrumental Variables
The Role of Market Capitalization on Portfolio flows
Dependent
variable
Sterilization
index
Capital
control
proxy
U.S.
interest
rate
Japanese
interest
rate
Mexican
crisis
dummy
Market
capitalization
Latin America:
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.174
(0.293)
-1.558
(-2.352)
-0.628
(-2.494)
0.089
(0.537)
-0.659
(-2.124)
0.029
(2.379)
Asia and others:
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.193
(1.382)
-0.188
(-0.704)
-0.024
(-0.288)
-0.107
(-2.039)
n.a. 0.001
(0.350)
Notes: The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been corrected for general forms
of heteroskedasticity. An n.a. denotes not applicable.
Table 7. Fixed Effects Estimates, Instrumental Variables
The Number of Listed Stocks n Portfolio flows
Dependent
variable
Sterilization
index
Capital
control
proxy
U.S.
interest
rate
Japanese
interest
rate
Mexican
crisis
dummy
Number of
listed stocks
Latin America:
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.794
(1.749)
-0.867
(-2.051)
-0.715
(-3.112)
-0.029
(-0.220)
-0.794
(-2.021)
0.033
(1.881)
Asia and others:
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.160
(1.153)
-0.602
(-0.779)
-0.043
(-0.510)
-0.093
(-1.926)
n.a. 0.005
(1.025)
Notes: The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been corrected for general forms
of heteroskedasticity. An n.a. denotes not applicable.
Table 8 Fixed Effects Estimates, Instrumental Variables
The Role of Turnover on Portfolio flows
Dependent
variable
Sterilization
index
Capital
control
proxy
U.S.
interest
rate
Japanese
interest
rate
Mexican
crisis
dummy
Turnover
ratio
Latin America:
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.596
(0.911)
-1.329
(-1.868)
-0.693
(-2.607)
-0.019
(-0.109)
-0.719
(-1.974)
0.023
(1.032)
Asia and others:
Portfolio flows
as a % of GDP
0.183
(1.312)
-0.191
(-0.707)
-0.953
(-2.880)
-0.026
(-0.311)
n.a. -0.007
(-0.015)
Notes: The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors have been corrected for general forms
of heteroskedasticity. An n.a. denotes not applicable.
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